No. 390
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
11 March 1941
# 138.
(Abstract)
The British Ambassador said as follows:
Neither the U.S. nor England desire trouble in the Far East, but if the worst comes to worst the U.S. will back up England. According to newspapers, the situation has eased somewhat in the Far East but it is still threatening.
Trans. 3-13-41
No. 391
FROM: Tokyo
TO: London
April 5, 1941
# 116.
Very secret. Re your # 227 [a].
Your suggestion seems reasonable, and we would like to have you continue negotiations on the basis of Britain’s proposal. We are giving study to a suggested revision to their plan, and will cable it as soon as it is finished —– break in the negotiations —–.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 4-8-41
No. 392
FROM: Havana (Nanjo)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
January 25, 1941
# 004.
A message sent from this office to the Consul at Bombay on the 14th (57 words, in the same code as this message, with the address and this minister’s name in English) was seized by the censor in India on the grounds of code messages being prohibited. We have protested through the telegram company, but to no avail. Please take the matter up from your office.
Trans. 1-28-41
Page A-205
No. 393
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: London (Japanese Ambassador)
13 February 1941
# 043.
On the 8th, Yamasita Steamship’s Yamafuji was stopped by a British armed merchant vessel at the entrance to the Gulf of Persia. All mail was removed. Representations have been made to British Ambassador. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Trans. 2-25-41
No. 394
FROM: Manila (Nihro)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
April 21, 1941
# 225.
(Abstract)
For the past year British authorities at Hongkong have been examining all mail carried on vessels touching Hongkong. This had delayed delivery considerably and some mail has failed to reach us. Therefore, please notify the Ministry of Communications to avoid vessels touching Hongkong, when sending mail, etc.
Trans. 5-2-41
No. 395
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo
February 22, 1941
# 162.
To be handled in Government Code.
Recently the following personal dialogue took place between myself and HOFSTRAATEN [a]. I endeavored to put him aright on points in which he lacked sufficient understanding but am reporting what was said for your information.
ISIZAWA: “Lately Australian and Netherlands newspapers have been reporting rumors of an impending crisis between Japan and the United States. Since there is no reason for thinking that a clash between the two nations is imminent I am at a loss to understand wherein lies the real meaning of these reports.”
HOFSTRAATEN: “We cannot view the situation as optimistically as you. Japan has placed soldiers in French Indo-China and is also doing a lot of fussing around in Thailand. It is hard to believe that her power will not be extended south of French Indo-China and that it will not only become a threat to Singapore but to the Dutch East Indies as well. England and America cannot be expected to remain blind spectators to all of this, and it is herein that the possibility of a Japanese-American conflict lies.”
ISIZAWA: “Japan’s demands upon French Indo-China and Thailand are being conducted through peaceful and diplomatic negotiations and for this reason England and America have no occasion for objecting. Anyway, the American fleet is not yet strong enough to attack Japan and this is another reason why no war is possible.”
HOFSTRAATEN: “No, you are badly mistaken there. I am satisfied from what I have heard from American naval officers that they could sink the Japanese navy within six weeks.”
ISIZAWA: “On the contrary, I have been told by Japanese navy men that in the event of an attack our ships could sink the entire American fleet within two weeks.”
Page A-206
HOFSTRAATEN: “Well, all that is beside the point. By the time Japan begins to directly threaten Singapore her supply lines from other places will be cut off and, moreover, the United States will stop all her exports to Thailand and Japan. You may be sure that the Dutch East Indies, too, know which side of the bread their butter is on and will hardly fail to adopt the same course. When all this happens it will not take a long time for poor-in-resources Japan to collapse.”
ISIZAWA: “Japan’s power of resistance is not as weak as you think, and if she finds out that the Dutch are working hand in hand with England and America her policy toward the Dutch East Indies will become extremely severe.”
[a] Assistant to the Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.
Trans. 2-28-41
No. 396
FROM: Bangkok (Futami) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
TO: Tokyo
February 24, 1941
# 129.
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
We have found a way to secure the secret documents and messages sent from the Netherlands Ministry here in Bangkok which we believe should be of considerable interest. Therefore, in order to translate these, please dispatch a secretary who understands the Dutch language to serve full time in this office. If that is impossible, send one here temporarily.
Trans. 3-1-41
No. 397
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Bangkok
April 24, 1941
# 222.
Strictly secret outside the department.
To be handled in Government code.
Re my # 167 [a].
According to an unimpeachable report, as a result of a secret investigation recently carried on by the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok, it was found that a native employee of this ministry had possession of keys to all the safes and was in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. A British Attaché in Bangkok has made a telegraphic report of these facts so, for the time being, please stop the schemes we had afoot.
[a] Tokyo tells Bangkok telegraphic clerk IT O will leave Tokyo on the 5th in order to transmit intelligence received directly.
Trans. 4-26-41
Page A-207
No. 398
FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo
January 17, 1941
# 25.
Part 2 of 3 [a].
Referring particularly to marine industry among other industries, HO [b] said: “I would like to have your attention called particularly to the following three points:
(1) Not only among the officials of the government but also among the people at large, what the Japanese fishermen along the Dutch East Indies Coast have been doing for the last several years has caused a great deal of antipathy.
(2) Setting aside the question of our attitude in time of peace, today, when in a total war declared against Germany and when martial law is in effect over the entire Dutch East Indies, we are unwilling to allow more Japanese fishermen to come to these shores.
(3) We, in the Dutch East Indies, want to encourage fishery among the natives and thus enable them to increase their food supply and for this reason we would like to reserve all profitable fishing zones for their use.” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In response to this, ISIZAWA emphatically stated: “You cannot contribute towards improvement of the economic relations between the two countries by digging up instances from the past. Now, if the authorities would concede to the wishes of the Japanese Government regarding fishery conducted by Japanese fishermen in the Dutch East Indies waters, the Japanese Government will in earnest take up the work of educating the fishermen and overseeing them so that no questions will come up between them and the Dutch East Indies authorities. Although the Dutch East Indies are under martial law, they are not facing the danger of war; and furthermore, are not the Japanese fishermen at present engaged in their work without causing any question to arise? Since we are not unwilling to avoid competition with the native fishermen, there is no reason for objecting to our wishes.”
The question of communication:
HO pointed out that since there is a powerful wireless telegraph and telephone system between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, he could not see any necessity of laying a cable line between these two countries. ISIZAWA explained: “What the Japanese Government is planning to lay is a cable line which has the highest efficiency in transmission of telegram, photographs, etc., and which does away with function in a new way with an efficiency all the shortcomings of the radio. Furthermore, it will function in a new way with an efficiency several times greater than the radio and would be very necessary in promoting both friendly relations and economic cooperation between the two countries. In fact, the Dutch East Indies also will greatly benefit from such a cable system.”
[a] Not available.
[b] HOFSTRAATEN, Assistant to the Director of Economic Affairs.
Trans. 1-22-41
No. 399
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo
January 10, 1941
# 32.
Re my # 22 [a] and # 29 [a].
As police surveillance and control by the N.E.I. authorities over our nationals here is steadily increasing, as you predicted in your successive reports, I plan to destroy the secret documents
Page A-208
relating to our schemes for the natives and Chinese residents (including wires) gradually. I would like to take all precautions, if worse comes to worse, for any eventuality. Please wire your answer to this.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 1-11-41