No. 1051
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.
Re my # 1138 [a].
There is not much time before HOOGSTRATEN leaves. Also I do not know what to do even though it has been decided to assign Takachiho [b] and the Nissho [b] because the number of nationals leaving here is so large. Please reply by telegram any suggestions that you might have.
[a] See IV, 1050.
[b] Boats leaving Dutch Indies for Japan.
Trans. 10-31-41
No. 1052
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) October 29, 1941
TO: Batavia # 682.
(Abstract.)
Re your # 1138 [a].
The British are actively promoting trade with the Netherlands East Indies and remittances in pounds sterling are increasing, see Tokyo to Batavia # 633 [b].
The Foreign Ministry believes that the Dutch do not realize the desperate situation of their branch banks and firms in Japan, and are making no efforts for their relief. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Very little cargo has been booked for the Nissho Maru.
The Finance Ministry states that if the funds of the Dutch banks (in Japan) are adequate, loans may be made to Dutch firms upon guarantees, even though they may have no deposit, just as Japanese firms in the Netherlands East Indies use the Industrial Bank.
We do not expect normal shipping conditions to be resumed until world conditions are settled; each consulate should so inform the Japanese residents in their area.
Although we cannot at present conclude the ¥1,200,000 barter agreement, and counter proposals are impossible, please ascertain from Hofstraaten if a fundamental Japanese-Netherlands East Indies trade policy cannot be suggested.
[a] See IV, 1050.
[b] See IV, 1079.
Trans. 11-4-41
No. 1053
FROM: Tokyo October 22, 1941
TO: Batavia # 659.
To Major Kuriya from the Assistant Chief of Staff.
Will you please inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch Indies in regard to
1. Training, formation, and aerial combat methods.
2. Organization, types, number and location of planes.
3. Types and number of planes being sent from England and the United States.
Trans. 10-24-41
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No. 1054
FROM: Batavia October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1150.
Secret within the Foreign Office. Secret within the Military.
Please convey to Assistant Chief of Staff: (Very secret.)
—– message # 25.
As complete and reliable information regarding the N.E.I. air forces is not yet in hand, I will merely report the main items:
(1) Items concerning pursuit plane units:
(a) Formation 3 planes in small triangle formation (sometimes 4 planes in a diamond shaped formation) and three of these formations making one unit.
(b) As for their combat methods, they have been observed to work on the plan of having three pursuit planes attack light bombers from behind and below, attacking one plane at a time, but aside from this particulars are not known.
(2) Items concerning organization.
(a) Aviation headquarters in the army at Bandoeng. The first Bandoeng air force is at Malang in western java, and the second air force seems to have charge of eastern and central Java (its symbol is “LFX”). The number of planes stationed there seems to be combat planes 9 (?) 2 planes —– light bombers —–
(b) Types of planes: (The number of planes given in brackets are very unreliable).
Combat (destroyer) planes: ZATAISUHUOOKU and Curtis interceptor —– reconnoiter and bombing plan-Curtis-Falcon. (About 5 (?)).
Light bombers: Glen Martin and Lockheed (about 150).
Flying boats: DONIERU (about 20) and recent Catalina 5 seaplanes (medium and small types, about 50).
(c) The number of planes for both army and navy total about 500 of first line planes, and adding second line planes it would come to between 700 and 1000 (including training planes). During the review of troops on 1 September, about 100 planes were flying over Batavia.
(d) Points at which planes are stationed: (numbers given are very unreliable). Also see Java message # 18 [b] in regard to stations.
(1) Aviation force # 1 Bandon.
Light bombers, 30
Combat planes, 70
KARIJATE “LFX” [b] and parachute troops (temporarily created).
TIRIRITAN [b], Combat planes, 12; light bombers. “LFX” BOITE SPORUHU [b], combat 70, light bombers, 6.
PUMXNBUKKU [b], (on south coast) some light bombers.
(2) Aviation force # 2. “LFX”.
AARAN [b], quite a number of light bombers.
SOERABAJA, (nrth field), combat planes, 40; scout planes, 30; light bombers, 30.
MAOSTIMATOI [b], (west of MAJION), light bomber “LFX”.
JOKUJA [b] , light bomber, combat plane.
(3) Naval planes:
SOERABAJA, flying boats, 20, (including some Catalinas recently arrived) Seaplanes, “LFX”. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
TANJONPURIOOKUb, flying boats, “LFX”.
( 4) Outlying territories.
Meando, flying boats on the lake to the south, “LFX”. Anbon, flying boat, “LFX” Barikupapan, light bomber, “LFX”.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(3) The situation as regard replenishments and arrivals.
(a) Two Catalina flying boats were ferried from the United States in early part of September, and three the latter part of October .
(b) Others, it would seem, are being imported from time to time by American and Dutch ships, but the actual facts are not known.
(c) According to newspaper reports contracts have been made in the United States amounting to $24,000,000 for the purchase of two-motored medium weight bombers of the B type.
(d) The supplementary naval appropriation just passed provides 14,340,000 guilders for plane purchases for the purpose of creating a torpedo plane force.
(e) There seem to be supply depots at each of the flying fields at Soerabaja and Bandoeng; and assembling and repair of planes are done at these places.
( 4) Other items:
(a) Of late volunteer flying corps are being organized in various places for the purpose of training second line pilots, and there are already about 40 each in training at Batavia and Soerabaja.
(b) Of late there has been an increase of plane accidents (especially light bombers) in the Netherlands East Indies. This is thought to be a result of these efforts of expansion.
[a] Not available.
[b] Place name.
Trans. 10-30-41
No. 1055
FROM: Batavia October 29,1941
TO: Tokyo # 1162.
Please relay to Vice War Minister and Chief of General Staff.
Java Message # 26.
1. On 23 October, Lieutenant-General TERUPORLUTEN was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands East Indies army. He had been Chief of the General Staff. The Lieutenant-General was born in 1887 in BOITENZORUFU on the island of Java and is of pure Dutch ancestry. He is from the artillery corps and, while a lieutenant, learned aviation. As such, he pioneered the science of aviation in the Netherlands East Indies. Subsequently he was attached to the various artillery corps and to the General Staff until today.
The Lieutenant-General is an authority on aviation and is endowed with a very scientific mind. He is probably the one most responsible for mechanizing the N .E.I. army.
He is an officer of an exceedingly high caliber, both as a gentleman and as a strategist. He has won the complete respect and confidence of his subordinates. He is the possessor of a brilliant mind and at the same time is an excellent mixer, socially. He enjoys a good reputation in general, although some are of the opinion that he leans somewhat toward Naziism.
2. The former assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, colonel BAKKARSU, was promoted to the rank of major-general, and to the office of Chief of the General Staff. He is of pure Dutch descent and was born in 1894. He is ex-infantry. He is an unbending officer and has little consideration and sympathy for his subordinates. He does not enjoy much popularity in general.
Trans. 10-30-41
A-483
No. 1056
FROM: Batavia October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1161.
(Foreign Office Secret.)
Please relay the information contained herein to the vice Minister of War and to the Chief of the General Staff.
Java Message # 27.
1. Under the order drafting natives to military service, the first group of about 1500 were inducted into the army day before yesterday, 27 October. (For details, please refer to messages addressed to the Foreign Office.) With regard to this, the East India Political Federation issued a statement along the following lines: “The people of the East Indies have come to realize their duty to serve in the armed services. The people of East India shall act as one in behalf of building up the strength of their land, through their legislative and political parties.”
Because of the pressure from the government, however, it is not believed that this organization will carry much weight.
2. There are numerous indications that every effort is being made in this area to build up a war time strength. According to the report of a legislator connected with the mobilization, who inspected the establishments at TIRACHZPPU (?), both the equipment and defense organizations are satisfactory, and military supplies are ample.
The Acting Chief of Economics, Hofstraaten, and Duff-Cooper of England, are going to visit Australia simultaneously. It is believed that they will confer on obtaining supplies while there.
Trans. 10-30-41
No. 1057
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1168.
Strictly confidential. To be transmitted to the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff.
Java Message No. 28.
According to newspaper reports, coast defense maneuvers were held in the 3rd Army District on a large scale on the 27th and 28th of last month. The landing points (to be ascertained later) were at unnamed points on the south coast of Java south of the Rumajan region, and at unnamed points on Bali and Madura.
There have been especially extensive maneuvers west of Batavia in the Mawok and Tangeran regions.
There are small ferry landings on the Chi Tarom river (on the west branch of the Bandoeng-Kulawan river) and on either bank of the Bandoeng-Chanjuru river in the mountainous region north of Bandoeng, the river being about 10 meters wide, about 20 kilometers north of Chanjuru, at Manisu. There are almost none at other points.
Investigator’s reliability ” A “.
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Trans. 11-7-41
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 1058
FROM: Batavia October 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1169.
1. On the 30th I attended a farewell dinner arranged by the Governor General, but before the dinner I had an opportunity to talk with the Governor General alone in his study on his invitation. Our conversation was directed entirely toward sounding out the attitude of the Dutch. (I had previously asked you for instructions as to points on which I should put emphasis, but I received no reply. ) The main points of the conversation were as follows: , Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(a) I first told him that ever since our advance into southern French Indo-China, relations between Japan and the Netherlands have been entirely deadlocked, but that on my return home I wish to represent aright to our authorities the attitude of the Dutch toward the international situation. The Governor General being an old acquaintance of Foreign Minister Togo, I told him that if he had any “message” to send I would be glad to receive it. The Governor General replied that the policies being pursued by the N .E.I. are just as we have been hearing them from the Dutch authorities in our daily contacts with them, and that we also understand the spirit of the Dutch people that forms the background for these policies, and therefore he would add nothing more. In other words the policies of the N.E.I. government are decided upon, and they have no thought but to follow out those policies. He further stated that in regard to future turns in the international situation and in regard to the position of the N.E.I., he of course is not too optimistic, but neither is he pessimistic.
(b) Upon my inquiry as to his opinions on the future of Japanese-Dutch relations, he replied that when the first opportunity shall have arrived when it will be possible to build upon a new foundation in improving relations between the two countries, he will seize upon that opportunity as he has not lost his desire to advance in a constructive manner .
2. From the calm, reassuring attitude manifested by the Governor General during our conversation, the impression received was that the N.E.I. have already made all preparations for resistance, even though Japan should resort to the use of force, and that they have no reason to be afraid, and therefore that there is no need for the Dutch to make any advances in seeking to effect an understanding with Japan at this time.
Trans. 11-6-41
No. 1059
FROM: Tokyo October 27,1941
TO: Batavia #674.
Most Secret.
Re your # 1147 [a].
Concerning my #657 [b], it is desired that all evacuees for the Hawaii (Maru), totaling up to 1700 or 1800 persons including those from Sumatra, be accommodated in the Takachiho Maru. Furthermore, since the Nissho Maru will be unable to call at Sumaran, the passengers from there should also be put aboard the Takachiho Maru at Surabaya.
If accommodations prove to be insufficient in that ship, the excess which cannot be embarked should be put aboard the Nissho Maru. However, in case the total number of evacuees increases further, but does not exceed 2000 passengers for the Takachiho Maru, please consult with the ship’s captain when it arrives at Surabaya. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
2. The Nissho Maru is equipped with accommodations for 450. As indicated in my ( # 657b) however, allocations have been made for only 50 passengers from Makkasar and Menado, and for 120 from Sandakan. If these quotas are not exceeded there should be considerable remaining accommodations in her. In this case, persons assigned to the Takachiho Maru may,
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if they so desire, be assigned passage in this excess space in the Nissho Maru for their return passage.
3. It is unnecessary to say this, but please pass on to the passengers that they must provide themselves individually with blankets, as well as clothing, etc. for cold weather .
4. The following limits on personal baggage have been set:
A. In the Takachiho Maru, 1 ton maximum. 1/2 ton is free, while above that will be paid for as freight (at the rate of 28 yen per ton).
B. In the Nissho Maru, 2 tons maximum of which 1 ton is free, and any excess at usual freight rates.
5. The price of tickets (there is no difference in food in the different classes) is as follows:
A. In the Takachiho Maru:
1st class 180 yen.
2nd class 130 yen.
3rd class 90 yen.
B. In the Nissho Maru:
1st class 130 yen.
2nd class 90 yen.
6. Furthermore, for your information the Takachiho Maru is scheduled to pick up baggage at Keelung for Moji on its return trip.
7. Referring to your # 1148 [b], the new accommodations should meet the requirements set forth in paragraph 1 above, though necessarily limited by the fixed accommodations in the ships. However, the head office of O.S.K. agrees that they can accommodate up to 1800. The Takachiho Maru normally takes 35 first class, 130 second, and 771 third class, but by squeezing in, doubling up, etc. you should in consultation with the captain be able to manage.
Please reply pertinent parts of this, priority, to Surubaya, Makassar, Menado, and Medan.
[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 10-28-41
No. 1060
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1156.
(Urgent.)
Strictly secret. Re your #674 [a].
1. Evacuees from central Java number about 200. If we sent them to Soerabaja, it would take 20,000 guilders for traveling and living expenses. Now, at Sumaran the customs officials have always treated us Japanese particularly well when it comes to our baggage. There our people would receive much better treatment. I don’t think it utterly out of the question to have the Nissho Maru dock there. In any case we have to consider the welfare of our people who are so hard put to it, so please arrange to have the Nissho Maru dock at Sumaran. If you have to, cancel the Batavia docking and let what was to be unloaded there be unloaded at Sumaran instead.
2. The Takachiho used to take on two tons apiece for the passengers, but you have just decided it can handle only one ton. (The South Seas company here has just advised the people concerned that they can take two tons.) The Takachiho, on the other hand, will have to take
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
on baggage at Keelung [b], so will you please duly consider the baggage of this ship’s passengers and permit me to let some other ship handle it. Wire me back.
[a] See IV, 1059.
[b] Keelung-Seaport in N.E. Formosa.
Trans. 10-31-41
No. 1061
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 12, 1941
TO: Batavia # 706.
(Urgent.)
(Departmental Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.)
Re your # 1195 [a].
As I tried to tell you in my # 685 [a] and my 131 [a] to Soerabaja, the Takichiho and the Nissho were especially dispatched in order to accommodate all those who were waiting. We sent those ships only after getting the consent of those concerned with great difficulty. But you did not understand the real intention of our department. How regrettable it is that we got half as many people as were expected. Now this department has lost face with the other departments concerned. I suppose that you, in looking over the situation, had your own reasons for holding them back, but the international situation is now delicate and in order to accommodate all those who were left behind by the Takichiho and any others who may wish to return to Japan, we are sending the Fuji Maru. It will arrive in your city on or about the 22nd of this month and leave Soerabaja on the 28th. It is being sent in strictest secrecy. Now those with whom we dealt in sending this ship at great personal loss consented to let it go, so this time I want you to have everything in readiness. Will you, therefore, with greatest urgency-and I emphasize those words-please get in touch with Soerabaja, Medan, and Menado.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 1062
FROM: Batavia November 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1177t
Recently, because of the evacuation of nationals, the Japanese language newspaper in the East Indies has had a decrease in income from subscriptions and advertisements and, recently, when the Nissho Maru and Takachiho Maru took away a large group of evacuee, the income dropped alarmingly. In order to keep going they have decreased the issues and also cut down on management as far as possible. While the Japanese language paper is decreasing, the Chinese language papers continue just as before and, because of the suspicions of the island government, more difficulties are presented which have resulted in further decreasing the issues of the paper. From the above decreases, they will save about 900 guilders in expenses of all kinds, but at the same time they expect to lose in income 1,100 guilders from subscriptions and 300 guilders from advertisements-a total of 1,400 guilders. This leaves a deficit of 500 guilders. We ask your special consideration to supply 2,500 guilders in order to cover
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this deficit for the five months from November to the end of the fiscal year. Please wire your answer .
Trans. 11-4-41
No. 1063
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #693.
(Strictly Secret.)
Few telephonic conversations are passing between Japan and Netherlands Indies. Lately calls in Netherlandish from Netherlanders have been falling off. We intend to curtail international telephone conversations and are now studying the matter (in order to diminish whatever effect might result, we might either limit the conversations or arrange to stop them temporarily, reestablishing them later if the situation demands.) Will you please wire me back your opinion.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 1064
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1188.
Re your # 693 [a].
In view of what I said in my # 968 [b], I think you might well go ahead and officially advise PABST that such telephonic communication is being stopped.
[a] See IV, 1063.
[b] See IV, 1064A which states that in view on the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language being meager, it was though best to suspend the international telephone service.
