No. 391
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Washington # 760.
Re your # 1061[a].
According to information contained in a message from our Ambassador to Manchukuo, the Manchukuoan police officials arrested three missionaries in Harbin on 22 October, on the charge of infraction of the peace preservation laws. These are Baptist missionaries which was the sect of those missionaries in Korea who were deported on the grounds of lesé majesté’.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US It is said that in Manchukuo these missionaries were telling Koreans in Manchukuo that Japanese and Manchukuoans were treating the Koreans poorly. They were instrumental in organizing secret Korean organizations.
Our Ambassador in Manchukuo requested this office’s suggestions on how to dispose of this matter. We, therefore, suggested that they follow the example set by http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US the officials in Korea and order these persons deported. To this, our Ambassador replied that after conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan authorities, it had been decided that our suggested means would be adopted.
This message has been relayed to Manchukuo.
[a] See IV, Part A 57.
Trans. 11‑12‑41
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No. 392
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 788.
Re your # 707[a].
The American Embassy in Tokyo requests that, if the Americans concerned have been given a fair trail, before banishment they be permitted to come to Harbin in order to settle their personal affairs. Please wire your suggestions.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-13‑41
No. 393
FROM: Hsinking November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 728.
Re your # 788[a].
As a result of conferences with the Manchurian and military authorities it has been decided to comply with your request. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[a] See IV, 392.
Trans. 11‑14‑41
No. 394
FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Hong Kong # 2319.
(Circular) (To be handled in Government Code.)
(Strictly secret outside the Department.)
Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan‑American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire’s foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:
a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.
In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long‑time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material, load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).
In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.
This message is directed to Nanso[a], Hokudai , Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hong Kong. Hokudai [a] will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 11‑26‑41
No. 395
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1091.
From the Finance Official to the Vice‑Minister of Finance.
It is at this time impossible to make any forecast as to how, in case of an emergency, diplomats, other government officials as well as some of the other Japanese should evacuate. After considering possible eventualities, I have come to the conclusion that it might be well to have some gold ready in Lima. Will you, therefore, please make suitable arrangements with the Yokohama Specie Bank (exchange control is most lenient in Peru). In case the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in that country has not formally been given a letter of attorney for this purpose, please take suitable steps by means of telegram sent through the Peruvian Ministry in Tokyo.
Trans. 11‑19‑41
No. 396
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 2330.
(Circular.)
The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.
First of all, the scrambling section shall be destroyed in the following manner: All the screws shall be removed and the machine reduced to the smallest pieces; all wires shall be detached; next, the most vital part of the entire machine, the scrambling nest (HENKŌGUN)‑(the revolving arrangement on which wires are attached, and which is located below that part is graduated in A, B, C, D)‑shall be very thoroughly destroyed; wires, insulations, panels, etc. shall be doused with kerosene and burned; gears which have alphabetical graduations and the switch arrangements which are opened and closed with keys shall also be destroyed, and these parts, together with other parts which cannot be destroyed by burning, shall be thrown into the ocean or treated with sulphuric acid and buried in the ground.
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Next, the printer shall be destroyed in very much the above manner. (The steel rod and bar attached to the lower part of typewriter “A” shall be removed and then the machine dismantled.)
All other markers on the machines and rectifiers shall be removed and burned. All screws which join pieces together shall be removed and disposed of, and all remaining parts shall be pounded with hammers.
Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bangkok (?) relay to Hanoi.
Trans. 11‑25‑41
No. 397
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1108.
Departmental Secret. “B” Class report.
1. According to DAINERI [c], a secretary attached to the Italian embassy, the United States government is doing everything in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. It is said that the American Ambassador to Rome, PHILLIPS (under instructions from ROOSEVELT), worked hard about three months ago to arrange a conference between ROOSEVELT and MUSSOLINI in the Azores, but on account of Italy’s fear of German objection, the attempt ended in a failure. (This may sound fantastic, but in view of the fact that the information comes from the Italian embassy and, also, of the fact that the United States was so lacking in common sense as to have demanded that Finland conclude an armistice with Soviet Russia, it cannot be said to be entirely improbable.)
2. The details of the demands which Germany made to Soviet Russia prior to the RussoGerman war (referred to in my # 869[a]) were ascertained from MASARIKKU [b] several days ago (when he met the Czech Premier in New York, the latter confirmed them).
3. I understand that the United States’ strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese‑American war is to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids (I understand that 16 airplane carriers are being either remodeled or camouflaged and that 32 additional ones are in the process of construction) and also to isolate the Japanese forces in China by severing Japanese supply routes in the China Sea by means of submarines.
[a] See 397A. Which says that HITLER demanded of STALIN: (1) Access to the oil and grain of the Ukraine; (2) joint operation of the Siberia railroad and establishment of military bases in the Far East; (3) place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] L. DANIELLI.
Trans. 11‑19‑41
No. 397A
FROM: Washington September 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 869.
B Intelligence. Foreign Office Secret.
1. Prior to his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler made the following three demands of Stalin:
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(1) Access to the oil and grain in the Ukraine. (By this was meant the occupation of that area for the duration of the war against England.)
(2) Joint operation of the Siberia Railroad and the right to establish military bases in the Far East, including the Vladivostok areas.
(3) Place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.
Stalin agreed in principle to the first two points but flatly refused to comply with point (3).
2. At this time Ribbentrop told Hitler that according to information he had obtained through his own intelligence organization, should Germany strike at the Soviet from the outside the church faction and the bourgeoisie which had not been thoroughly crushed by the Soviet regime, would immediately rise up. The destruction of the Stalin regime would then be an exceedingly simple matter.
On being advised thusly by Ribbentrop Hitler launched his attack against Russia. Since the Soviet resistance has been surprisingly stubborn Ribbentrop has fallen in Hitler’s favor. The intelligence system that Ribbentrop headed has either been disbanded or taken over by the military.
(The above is the gist of what our New York informant ‑‑‑‑‑[a] related to Terasaki in Washington. ‑‑‑‑‑[a] got his information from Hauptman who until recently was in Italy, engaged in the intelligence business, and who is well versed in European matters. ‑‑‑‑- [a] expressed much confidence in the veracity of this information.)
This message was relayed to New York.
(Tran. Note: Above message was sent on 1 October from Tokyo to Berlin, verbatim, except that last two paragraphs were omitted.)
[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.
(No Trans. date in text. LWJ)
No. 398
FROM: Shanghai November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 2103.
Re my # 2089[a].
1. On the 15th, the Commander of the American Marines told the Commander in charge of the Japanese forces here, who is also Chairman of the Joint Defense Committee, that he had received official orders for the withdrawal of the American Marines here in the immediate future.
2. The Japanese army in harmony with previous discussions (see paragraph 2 of my caption telegram) desires to have responsibility for the defense of the “C” area, after the withdrawal of the Marines, divided between the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai Volunteer squad. Whenever the Japanese army deems it necessary to preserve the public peace, they will participate freely in the policing of this area. An announcement of the above is scheduled to be made to the President of the Municipal Council and the Commander of the Italian force by the 20th.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11‑25‑41
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No. 399
FROM: Tokyo November 18, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 833.
Re your # 720[a].
Although Japan, itself, has not frozen funds, but because America has, Japan has not granted permits, generally speaking, for the receiving of remittances. However, we are Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire considering it to the extent of remittances from America to religious organizations in Japan, and from Japan to cultural organizations in America (an estimate of 400,000 yen). Right now we are in the midst of negotiating for this with America.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11‑24‑41
No. 400
FROM: Tokyo November 18, 1941
TO: Washington # 788.
Strictly secret. Re your # 1098[a].
1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of “B” if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my # 786[b] for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will, at this sailing, have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staff who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applications. The reason, was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.
2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents, and so forth, as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.
3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of “B”. We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.
4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.
[a] See IV, Part A 115.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 11‑19‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 401
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 20, 1941
TO: Ankara Circular # 2364.
Strictly secret.
1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.
2. Insofar as Japanese‑American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situations not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.
This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.
Trans. 11‑28‑41
No. 402
FROM: Shanghai November 20, 1941
TO: Amoy # 439.
Message to Tokyo # 2119.
Re my # 2103[a].
1. At the meeting of the United International Settlement Council on the 10th, it was decided that the plan suggested by the Administrative General Chief would be followed, of having the Military Training Bureau police assume patrol of the British section after the withdrawal of the (American ?) Marines, the volunteer corps serving as reserves. There were no objections to continuing the present (traffic control system ?). These decisions were then communicated to the Marines.
2. The position to be taken by the Military Training Bureau was decided upon (if a cooperative protection plan would be established ?) in which the organization structure would be determined by the various army groups participating. Doubtlessly, there will be communications from the marine command section giving today’s decision and requesting your opinion.
[a] (See IV, 398.)
Trans. 11‑26‑41
