Archive for May, 2009

KOSAKA to the Chief of the Courier Department 9.gift.001001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 31, 2009

No.  610

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 12, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 18.

(Circular.) (Message to Tokyo # 277.)

‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑. The Argentine Minister, KARUDEWOTEI, on the 11th at a luncheon given by me, told me that his home government had instructed him to return home in a hurry before a Japanese‑American war started. Since the outbreak of war in the Pacific seemed to be inevitable, they did not care one whit ‑‑‑‑­- ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑. Consequently, he told me confidentially that he was going to fly home by clipper.

This is clear corroboration that Argentina will not participate in the war, it seems to me. It seems likely that they intend to watch the development of the situation.

Furthermore, Argentina is understood now to be burning several million tons of surplus wheat.

Trans.  12‑3‑41

No.  611

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 484.

An account of what the Foreign Office officials said about the Panama question appeared in all the newspapers as an AP dispatch from Tokyo. However, no one paid any attention to it. Furthermore, up to now the atmosphere in this country has been calm so far as Japanese are concerned. Not only that, but the http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US Government, too, has stuck to a neutral policy. I take this, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   however, as an indication that they may be going to apply pressure against us, so I have decided to make representations to the Government of this country and, if possible, prevent an unfortunate course of events.

Trans.  12‑1‑41

No.  612

FROM: Buenos Aires (BUEAS)                                                           November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)                            # 017.

1. The progress of the negotiations between Japan and America, and the movements of our troops from Central China, point to the fact that America has decided to declare war against Japan soon.

This appears plain in the reports received from America.

2. Recently Britain has been rapidly calling up all British male citizens in Argentina (up to about 40 years of age).

Details of their number, destination, etc., are unknown.

Trans.  1‑14‑45

No.  613

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 505.

Re your # 246[a].

On the 8th, I had a talk with the Foreign Minister in regard to negotiations to foster an understanding (see my # 487[a]), and the next day LA RAZON not only published the fact of my talk with the Foreign Minister, but also reported as having been confirmed by the Foreign Office that negotiations to foster an understanding between Japan and the Argentine

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were already in progress. After this the English and American newspapers ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ bill for America to purchase all of Argentina’s surplus products for three years. (Axis ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑­‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑) ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ government acts as though it were not very enthusiastic to­wards reaching a settlement. Although they did not say that Argentina had announced its refusal to cooperate, they left a false impression from the above details that it had been announced.

On the 20th NAKAMURA went to the Vice‑Chief of the Commerce Bureau to try to verify the source of this report and of leaks regarding the contents of our conversation. (On the 19th a UP writer told NAKAMURA that he knew from Foreign Office sources that the purpose of these talks was trade negotiations). He said that if the Foreign Office was the source of these reports, we considered it very deplorable, but they replied that they knew nothing about it. Afterwards the Foreign Minister told me privately that he was accustomed to give light replies in press conferences, but that he would request a thorough investigation as to the real source of the report in the Foreign Office.

I believe that it is important to realize that publicity is not desirable in this problem of approaching a commercial settlement, and that the forthcoming reopening of negotiations be kept strictly secret. I plan to request when the conferences open that if any announce­ment must be made, it be made with the approval of the members of the Argentine and Japanese committee.


[a] Not available.

Trans.  12‑2‑41

No.  614

FROM: Buenos Aires                                                                           December 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 520.

On the occasion of my conversations with the Foreign Minister on the 5th, we referred to Japan‑American relations. I said bluntly, “In the event Japan and the United States find themselves unfortunately in a state of war, what will Argentina’s attitude be?” The Foreign Minister replied, “The attitude of Argentina will be restrained by Article 15 of the Havana Protocol (the declaration calling for joint defense of the American continents). That is to say in the event of hostilities arising between Japan and the United States the various countries of South America certainly will be asked by the United States to make application of this article. At that time various countries of South America will treat the United States as a so‑called non‑aggressor nation (Japan will naturally be treated as an aggressor nation). Nevertheless, in the event that the United States requests aid from us, we will be forced to grant facilities to that country. But, insofar as Argentina herself is concerned, no ill treat­ment will be meted out to Japan. Though this is but qualified neutrality, it is the inter­pretation we apply to the above mentioned declaration.”

In regard to this interpretation there is some doubt. Therefore I said, “After I have duly studied the matter, I will request an early interview.” Thereupon I left.

Since the situation has radically changed, I have transmitted the above as it stands to Brazil.

Trans.  12‑8‑41

No.  615

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              December 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 521.

Re your # 258[a].

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On the 8th, I interviewed the Foreign Minister and reminded him how Japan and Argentina have maintained amity for many years and how we respect and trust his country. I went on to say that we regard Argentina always as the leader of all South America and then told him what you advised me to in your preceding telegram. He replied, “Yes, we have been friends a long time and what you say is all right so far as I am concerned. However, I must talk it over with the President directly and I will give you a reply today or tomorrow. You know, London, Ottawa, Canberra and Chungking have all made the same statement that you have to us. However, we have not received any solicitations from Washington or Rio.”

(According to a radio report, Brazil has announced solidarity with the United States.)


[a] Not available.

Trans.  12‑10‑41

No.  616

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              December 8, 1941

TO: Rio                                                                                                Circular # 181.

Message from Tokyo # 259.

Simultaneously with the outbreak of war between Japan and America and England, it may become impossible for us to get in direct contact with Mexico, Central America, Panama and Cuba so will you be ever on the alert to gather any information possible about the activities of these nations particularly any Japanese measures, declarations Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  of war, detention of Japanese, and etc.

Wire me back whenever you know anything.

Please send, as this Foreign Minister’s instructions, to Rio, Valparaiso, Lima, Bogota, and Caracas.

Trans.  12‑9‑41

No.  617

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 24, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2222.

(Strictly secret.)

At the end of September we changed the direction, time, and contents of our foreign broadcasts. Will you, therefore, think back http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US   in the past and make any suggestions you deem wise concerning technique, contents, priority and so forth.

Relay to San Francisco, Rio, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Panama, Honolulu.

Trans.  11‑4‑41

No.  618

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)                                                               November 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 453.

Re your Circular # 2222[a]

Judging from reports from the various districts, of late reception conditions have improved considerably and all are happy over it. In view of the fact that communications with Japan have almost been cut off, and it is impossible to secure newspapers and magazines from home, we would like to have “news” in Japanese broadcast as much in detail as possible. Also because of the present situation, in broadcasting the daily news in Spanish and

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Portuguese I think it is very important that discussions of the principal events and problems of the day be added in order to make this country and all South American quarters under­stand the fairness of our position. Please take steps to see that this is done immediately.


[a] See IV, 617.

Trans.  11‑13‑41

No.  619

FROM: Rio (Ishii)                                                                                October 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 439.

Courier KOSAKA arrived here the 29th. According to the last mail received, he is to return to Japan via the U.S. It is desired that a member of this office accompany him to New York.

Trans.  11‑17‑41

No.  620

FROM: Rio (Ishii)                                                                                November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 456.

From KOSAKA to the Chief of the Courier Department.

I intend to arrive in Washington on the 4th or 5th of December and will be in San Francisco by the middle of the month. It would be well for MAO, in Mexico, to make connections with me at that time (as far as I am able to tell here, Washington would be the best place).  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US

Imperial General Headquarters 5.igh.000299 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 17, 2009

No. 391

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 760.

Re your # 1061[a].

According to information contained in a message from our Ambassador to Manchukuo, the Manchukuoan police officials arrested three missionaries in Harbin on 22 October, on the charge of infraction of the peace preservation laws. These are Baptist missionaries which was the sect of those missionaries in Korea who were deported on the grounds of lesé majesté’.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US It is said that in Manchukuo these missionaries were telling Koreans in Manchukuo that Japanese and Manchukuoans were treating the Koreans poorly. They were instrumental in organizing secret Korean organizations.

Our Ambassador in Manchukuo requested this office’s suggestions on how to dispose of this matter. We, therefore, suggested that they follow the example set by  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US   the officials in Korea and order these persons deported. To this, our Ambassador replied that after conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan authorities, it had been decided that our suggested means would be adopted.

This message has been relayed to Manchukuo.


[a] See IV, Part A 57.

Trans.  11‑12‑41

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No. 392

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 788.

Re your # 707[a].

The American Embassy in Tokyo requests that, if the Americans concerned have been given a fair trail, before banishment they be permitted to come to Harbin in order to settle their personal affairs. Please wire your suggestions.


[a] Not available.

Trans.  11-13‑41

No. 393

FROM: Hsinking                                                                                  November 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 728.

Re your # 788[a].

As a result of conferences with the Manchurian and military authorities it has been decided to comply with your request. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] See IV, 392.

Trans.  11‑14‑41

No. 394

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Hong Kong                                                                                   # 2319.

(Circular) (To be handled in Government Code.)

(Strictly secret outside the Department.)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan‑American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire’s foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long‑time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material, load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far

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East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nanso[a], Hokudai , Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hong Kong. Hokudai [a] will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.


[a]  Kana spelling.

Trans.  11‑26‑41

No. 395

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1091.

From the Finance Official to the Vice‑Minister of Finance.

It is at this time impossible to make any forecast as to how, in case of an emergency, diplomats, other government officials as well as some of the other Japanese should evacuate. After considering possible eventualities, I have come to the conclusion that it might be well to have some gold ready in Lima. Will you, therefore, please make suitable arrange­ments with the Yokohama Specie Bank (exchange control is most lenient in Peru). In case the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in that country has not formally been given a letter of attorney for this purpose, please take suitable steps by means of telegram sent through the Peruvian Ministry in Tokyo.

Trans.  11‑19‑41

No. 396

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 2330.

(Circular.)

The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.

First of all, the scrambling section shall be destroyed in the following manner: All the screws shall be removed and the machine reduced to the smallest pieces; all wires shall be detached; next, the most vital part of the entire machine, the scrambling nest (HENKŌ­GUN)‑(the revolving arrangement on which wires are attached, and which is located below that part is graduated in A, B, C, D)‑shall be very thoroughly destroyed; wires, insulations, panels, etc. shall be doused with kerosene and burned; gears which have alphabetical graduations and the switch arrangements which are opened and closed with keys shall also be destroyed, and these parts, together with other parts which cannot be destroyed by burn­ing, shall be thrown into the ocean or treated with sulphuric acid and buried in the ground.

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Next, the printer shall be destroyed in very much the above manner. (The steel rod and bar attached to the lower part of typewriter “A” shall be removed and then the machine dismantled.)

All other markers on the machines and rectifiers shall be removed and burned. All screws which join pieces together shall be removed and disposed of, and all remaining parts shall be pounded with hammers.

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bangkok (?) relay to Hanoi.

Trans.  11‑25‑41

No. 397

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1108.

Departmental Secret. “B” Class report.

1. According to DAINERI [c], a secretary attached to the Italian embassy, the United States government is doing everything in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. It is said that the American Ambassador to Rome, PHILLIPS (under instructions from ROOSEVELT), worked hard about three months ago to arrange a conference between ROOSEVELT and MUSSO­LINI in the Azores, but on account of Italy’s fear of German objection, the attempt ended in a failure. (This may sound fantastic, but in view of the fact that the information comes from the Italian embassy and, also, of the fact that the United States was so lacking in common sense as to have demanded that Finland conclude an armistice with Soviet Russia, it cannot be said to be entirely improbable.)

2. The details of the demands which Germany made to Soviet Russia prior to the Russo­German war (referred to in my # 869[a]) were ascertained from MASARIKKU [b] several days ago (when he met the Czech Premier in New York, the latter confirmed them).

3. I understand that the United States’ strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese‑American war is to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids (I understand that 16 airplane carriers are being either remodeled or camouflaged and that 32 additional ones are in the process of construction) and also to isolate the Japanese forces in China by severing Japanese supply routes in the China Sea by means of submarines.


[a] See 397A. Which says that HITLER demanded of STALIN: (1) Access to the oil and grain of the Ukraine; (2) joint operation of the Siberia railroad and establishment of military bases in the Far East; (3) place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

[b] Kana spelling.

[c] L. DANIELLI.

Trans.  11‑19‑41

No. 397A

FROM: Washington                                                                             September 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 869.

B Intelligence. Foreign Office Secret.

1. Prior to his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler made the following three demands of Stalin:

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(1) Access to the oil and grain in the Ukraine. (By this was meant the occupation of that area for the duration of the war against England.)

(2) Joint operation of the Siberia Railroad and the right to establish military bases in the Far East, including the Vladivostok areas.

(3) Place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

Stalin agreed in principle to the first two points but flatly refused to comply with point (3).

2. At this time Ribbentrop told Hitler that according to information he had obtained through his own intelligence organization, should Germany strike at the Soviet from the outside the church faction and the bourgeoisie which had not been thoroughly crushed by the Soviet regime, would immediately rise up. The destruction of the Stalin regime would then be an exceedingly simple matter.

On being advised thusly by Ribbentrop Hitler launched his attack against Russia. Since the Soviet resistance has been surprisingly stubborn Ribbentrop has fallen in Hitler’s favor. The intelligence system that Ribbentrop headed has either been disbanded or taken over by the military.

(The above is the gist of what our New York informant ‑‑‑‑‑[a] related to Terasaki in Washington. ‑‑‑‑‑[a] got his information from Hauptman who until recently was in Italy, engaged in the intelligence business, and who is well versed in European matters. ‑‑‑‑- [a] expressed much confidence in the veracity of this information.)

This message was relayed to New York.

(Tran. Note: Above message was sent on 1 October from Tokyo to Berlin, verbatim, except that last two paragraphs were omitted.)


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

(No Trans. date in text.  LWJ)

No. 398

FROM: Shanghai                                                                                 November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 2103.

Re my # 2089[a].

1. On the 15th, the Commander of the American Marines told the Commander in charge of the Japanese forces here, who is also Chairman of the Joint Defense Committee, that he had received official orders for the withdrawal of the American Marines here in the immediate future.

2. The Japanese army in harmony with previous discussions (see paragraph 2 of my cap­tion telegram) desires to have responsibility for the defense of the “C” area, after the with­drawal of the Marines, divided between the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai Volunteer squad. Whenever the Japanese army deems it necessary to preserve the public peace, they will participate freely in the policing of this area. An announcement of the above is scheduled to be made to the President of the Municipal Council and the Com­mander of the Italian force by the 20th.


[a]  Not available.

Trans. 11‑25‑41

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No. 399

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 18, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 833.

Re your # 720[a].

Although Japan, itself, has not frozen funds, but because America has, Japan has not granted permits, generally speaking, for the receiving of remittances. However, we are Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire considering it to the extent of remittances from America to religious organizations in Japan, and from Japan to cultural organizations in America (an estimate of 400,000 yen). Right now we are in the midst of negotiating for this with America.


[a] Not available.

Trans.  11‑24‑41

No. 400

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 18, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 788.

Strictly secret. Re your # 1098[a].

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of “B” if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my # 786[b] for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will, at this sailing, have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as mem­bers of their staff who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applications. The reason, was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents, and so forth, as are in the possession of Japa­nese companies and chambers of commerce.

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of “B”. We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.


[a] See IV, Part A 115.

[b] Not available.

Trans.  11‑19‑41

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No. 401

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Ankara                                                                                          Circular # 2364.

Strictly secret.

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese‑American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is consider­able doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situations not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

Trans.  11‑28‑41

No. 402

FROM: Shanghai                                                                                 November 20, 1941

TO: Amoy                                                                                           # 439.

Message to Tokyo # 2119.

Re my # 2103[a].

1. At the meeting of the United International Settlement Council on the 10th, it was decided that the plan suggested by the Administrative General Chief would be followed, of having the Military Training Bureau police assume patrol of the British section after the withdrawal of the (American ?) Marines, the volunteer corps serving as reserves. There were no objections to continuing the present (traffic control system ?). These decisions were then communicated to the Marines.

2. The position to be taken by the Military Training Bureau was decided upon (if a coopera­tive protection plan would be established ?) in which the organization structure would be determined by the various army groups participating. Doubtlessly, there will be com­munications from the marine command section giving today’s decision and requesting your opinion.


[a] (See IV, 398.)

Trans.  11‑26‑41

Japanese Ambassador on November 20 7.min.01 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 13, 2009

No. 186

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Oral.

Strictly confidential.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and

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sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

Trans.  11-29- 41

No. 187

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

(Extremely Urgent)

(Part 2 of 4.)

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary “modus vivendi” could be agreed upon to be in affect while the conversations, looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 188

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

(To be handled in government code.)http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans.  11-29-41

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No. 189

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our future conversations.

The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 [sic] and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 190

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1189.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, “For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.” So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called “four principles.”http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and  Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Trans.  11-28-41

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No. 191

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1189.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Trans.  11-28-41

No. 192

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 1191.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him.  First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages # 1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

(1) HULL said: “Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it.”

(2) I said: “You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either.”

HULL retorted: “As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly, rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at

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the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the face of that.”http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

French Indo-China and Thailand 5.fre.001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 9, 2009

No. 14

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                 http://Louis-J-Sheehan.biz                                           October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1008.

(In 3 parts complete.)

From Minister Wakasugi.

U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called “Hitlerism”, (establishing of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its wartime structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrollering over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on those grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of absolute non-discrimination and equal

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opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.). Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military’s co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.

  1. Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that are not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.

In any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that

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the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.

Trans. 11-1-41

No. 15

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1010.

(In 2 parts complete.)

Chief of Office routing.

I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.

1. Admiral a told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany’s superior propaganda work. I have heard ______ [a] who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo.) There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was “very delicate and very changeable”. (Reported in the New York Times, 28th.)

To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to the British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that Britain did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.

He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] Name withheld.

Wakasugi 8.wak.1123 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 9, 2009

No. 3

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency’s instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don’t want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don’t want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don’t think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 4

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 23, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   No Number.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency’s reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reasons, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

Trans. 10-23-41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 5

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 21, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 698.

Re your # 966 [a].

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] See III, 284. Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i.e., the Open Door up-to-date).

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 973.

Yesterday, the Sabbath day, _____[a] told me the following:

“Through Finland and Bulgaria, Germany is putting out peace feelers and she stands some chance of succeeding. She will probably embark on a peace offensive offering Great Britain generous terms. Now that Great Britain has taken Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, the LLOYD GEORGE wing may listen to what HITLER has to say. As CHURCHILL’s position for some time has been none too safe, ROOSEVELT is upholding the Prime Minister with might and main.”

Not long ago the Secretary of State said to me, “Doubtless some ‘QUISLINGS’ will make their appearance in Great Britain. That’s why the United States Government is supporting CHURCHILL so strongly.”

Well, the trust of the English people in CHURCHILL seems to me rather real, so I do not put much belief in this story. However, the strange part of it is that _____[a] has always believed in a German defeat. Nevertheless, he came and told me this story, so it may be worth thinking about.


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 10-21-41

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No. 7

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 989.

Re your # 698 [a].

Today I am going to have WAKASUGI go and continue his talks with WELLES in a friendly fashion. However, the Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attaché some secret advice. Now, what I want to know is this: Is this the future policy of the Government? I feel sure that I will get some instructions from you today. However, as we have to continue our talks, for my private information let me know something about this immediately.


[a] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 8

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Re your # 698 [a].

On the 24th from 2:30 p.m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as “the Japanese Navy is ‘itching for action’ “, and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.


[a] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 9

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

(Part 2 of 4.)

WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech

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made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other war-like statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary’s speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, “As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 10

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

(Part 3 of 4.)

“However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan’s duties to the Three-Power Alliance.” He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 11

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire                                            October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #995.

(Part 4 of 4.)

WAKASUGI replied, saying, “Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven’t the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point.”

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Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, “We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank.”

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 12

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 25, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 709.

Re your # 989[a].

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.

With regard to the military general staff office’s message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff’s hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message # 698[b] (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U. S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de


[a] See IV, 7.

[b] See IV, 5.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 13

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1004.

Chief of Office Routing.

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.

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Knox’s speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a “strong” individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.

  1. Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de

Trans. 10-30-41