No. 218
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Washington http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 652.
(Part 4 of 4-Parts 1, 2, and 3 translated 18 August) .
With regard to the peace set-up, subsequent to the conclusion of the war, Welles had something to say. The occasion was the dedication of the addition to the (Swedish ?) Legation here, at which time he said in his speech that the basic principle would be the equal accessibility of raw materials by all the countries of the world, and the establishment in one form or another of a league which will include the entire world. (Unlike the present League of Nations, the one under consideration will have arms to enforce order). He enlarged upon that speech now, in his talk with Wakasugi. After strongly promoting the above two points, he went on to say that talk of disarmament would almost certainly be brought up. He pointed out that nothing but disillusion could come of disarmament talks without first settling upon the accessibility of raw materials.
Wakasugi then brought up the subject of the Stimson policy as it was expressed at the time of the Manchurian Incident at which time Stimson said that the United States would not recognize any gains which were made by the use of arms. “Isn’t it a fact, though,” Wakasugi asked, “that most of the world is what it is today, such as -for a glaring example-the U.S. Policy with regard to the Caribbean, the fruits of armed warfare? You may say that by maintaining this status, you are maintaining a status quo. However, from the eyes of a historian, it is merely a matter of the time element, isn’t it?”
Welles replied that he himself could see points which were objectionable in the past of the United States. However, the United States has since been striving to correct those wrongs.
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Certainly, if history is permitted to repeat itself, forever, no progress could be made in man kind. He went on to point out that one had to change one’s policies in accordance with the times.
I shall not go into the other points they discussed.
Trans. 8-22-41
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PART B-JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
No. 219
FROM: Washington May 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 319.
Re your # 45 [a] and # 180 [b].
I have had Terazaki [c] of Intelligence make an official trip to New York for the purpose of keeping in touch with the Consul-General [d] there, and we have come to the following conclusions.
1. We are of the opinion that Roosevelt’s dictatorial attitude is becoming more pronounced and the government is leaning toward all-out war. Therefore, we desire that you remit immediately as large an amount as possible so that we may have funds with which to carry on intelligence work in the emergency created by America’s entry into the war. For this purpose we assume that Japanese-American relations will continue as at the present.
2. The duties of an intelligence office are becoming increasingly difficult. Because of the existence of the Dies Committee and of the application of the regulations regarding Americans in foreign employ and regarding foreigners resident in America the gathering of accurate secret information is far from easy. This is only one example and there are many other “delicate” problems, so please understand the delay in my answering telegraphic (requests for information) .
3. We wish to make Washington and New York one unit and have a unified policy for it. Therefore we wish to get your approval before Terazaki starts for his post. We wish to have Consul Inagaki come here to serve. We feel that we should have here at least one-third of the personnel that they have in Shanghai for intelligence. Therefore, we are looking for temporary employees, (non-career clerks). Furthermore, we wish to have the officer in charge of intelligence visit New York about the 10th of every month.
4. The title of the officer in charge of intelligence will be that of “press attaché”. His duties will be as decided in the business conference on March 4th, Article 61 (1), as follows:
A. Ordinary investigations and,
B. The development of intelligence.
“A” will of course include the investigation and gathering of secret information on the division in American public opinion regarding the rapprochement in Japanese-American relations based on the peace movement. But we wish to preclude such policies as the strategy being employed in the present negotiations.
5. A summary of the present state of the policy is as follows: We are making personal contacts on every hand. However, at this place and in New York we are continuing the existing formal contacts and gathering secret information. In addition, to this, the officer in charge of intelligence has contacts with:
(A) J, and W, who are in close touch with the President and his wife. The President is cultivating power through the “relief workers” and the “W. P. A.” and other agencies. In addition to this, since his third term anyone who opposes him becomes the target of his attacks and his dictatorial tendencies are becoming more marked, therefore it is natural that we should pay special attention to those in close touch with him.
One or two items regarding Roosevelt’s position: Evidence was brought out in the Senate to the effect that the former Ambassador to England, Kennedy, had not paid his 1932 income tax, but the President maintained silence. According to other secret information, Wilkie had
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a secret understanding with Roosevelt and attacked him in his public speeches more than was necessary as a Presidential candidate and enjoyed scandalizing public opinion, however, had he by any chance become President he would have become a mere puppet of Roosevelt. Again, told Terazaki that originally he was an isolationist, but that now in view of the opposition he was keeping silent. Six months from now if he said he were an isolationist he would not be able to go about in safety.
(B) W of the State Department. When Terazaki was a student at Brown University he became well acquainted with W.
(C) G of the Senate.
When Terazaki was in Brown University he was greatly helped by this G. (D) The relationship of the “America First Committee” to Lindberg and W. Every time Lindberg makes a speech the German newspapers approve and American newspaper reporters in Germany write it up and American newspapers make a big thing of it so that the impression is conveyed that Lindberg is an agent of Germany. Because of this, Lindberg and the Committee are very perplexed and according to W, Lindberg has been cautioned by the German Embassy. Since then he has been in touch with W.
(E) D, an Irish American. D told our intelligence officer that a Jewish American Justice of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter, was packing the key posts of the government with Jewish Americans. But that American antipathy toward Jews is increasing to such an extent that eventually anti-Jewish influence would prevail.
(F) Persons with religious affiliations. ( 1) Catholic. (2) Protestant. (3) Undecided. The Catholics are the ones who are concerned in the present negotiations.
(G) The Brown University Club. This meets regularly once a month and at other times at which times he (Terazaki) is present.
6. Concerning the salary for employing nationals and foreigners. The future is another matter; however, judging from the past unless our general funds are increased it will be impossible to move. We wish to have you cognizant of the actual situation and when the opportune time comes we wish to take decisive action.
7. Looking at the funds for general intelligence, of the $30,000 income, only about $3,900 a year is available for actual development of intelligence and about $1,800 a year for entertainment and receptions. However, in the decision of the committee held on March 4th of this year regarding intelligence business, and the stipulations of the policy regarding propagation of intelligence, it was variously affirmed that of course the utmost effort would be put forth and that we would need no small sum for expenses. According to the present allotment we will need for the present year the sum of $500,000 for the development of intelligence. We respectfully request this.
[a] “In view of our decision to de-emphasize propaganda and concentrate on Intelligence, as directed in my dispatch # 44, please make recommendations for ensuing propaganda allotments.
[b] Not available
[c] Especially assigned to U.S. for intelligence and propaganda work.
[d] Morishima; he had long experience in intelligence work in Manchuria and China; Counselor of Embassy, Washington, until March 1941.
Trans. 5-21-41
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No. 220
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 16, 1941
TO: Singapore # 120.
According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships.
(Strictly Secret)
Trans. 7-23-41
No. 221
FROM: Washington June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 386.
(To San Francisco, Los Angeles, & Seattle, Cir. # 121)
Secret.
Because of the suppression exercised against our Naval representatives (Language Officers) by the United States authorities in a series of recent incidents, our Navy has, for the time being, stopped stationing these officials by limiting the personnel. Inasmuch as in the light of the relations at present prevailing between Japan and the United States, observation of the movements of the American Navy is one of the most important matters, will you observe the movements of ships and gather other information that may be of interest to our Navy and wire us the required information as it comes to you?
Trans. 6-25-41
No. 222
FROM: Seattle (Sato) June 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 056.
(1) Ships at anchor on the 22nd/23rd (?):
(Observations having been made from a distance, ship types could not be determined in most cases.)
1. Port of Bremerton:
1 battleship (Maryland type)
2 aircraft tenders (one ship completed and has letter “E” on its funnel).
2. Port of —–:
1 destroyer
11 coast guard cutters (Ships under repair): 1 destroyer
11 (appear to be) minesweepers 3 coast guard cutters
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3. Sand Point:
2 newly constructed hangars
4. Boeing:
New construction work on newly built factory building # 2. Expansion work on all factory buildings.
Trans. 7-14-41
No. 223
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 022.
Action Tokyo as # 092. (Abstract)
Report to Washington and Tokyo on announcement on the 4th by the Maritime Commission that 28 ships are to be pressed into service for the Army and Navy (7 to Army, 21 to Navy), etc.
Trans. 6-19-41
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US
No. 224
FROM: Hollywood (Los Angeles) June 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 7.
(Circular)
Message to Tokyo # 83.
On the 20th, the Saratoga, and on the 24th, the Chester (?), Louisville, the 12th Destroyer Squadron and Destroyers # 364, 405, 411, 412, and 413 entered San Diego, and all of them left on the 31st.
Trans. 6-20-41
No. 225
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 2, 1941
TO: Panama # 16.
Please find out if the aircraft carrier, Lexington, has passed through the canal recently from the Pacific Ocean.
Secret.
Trans. 6-20-41
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No. 226
FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 6, 1941
TO: Washington # 13.
Message to Tokyo # 48.
Movements of American warships as I have observed them:
The following ships were observed to move from the Pacific into the Atlantic through the Canal:
1. On May Ist, four destroyers (four funnels, # 100, large size); on June 3rd, a destroyer # 436; on the night of the 4th one light, one heavy cruiser and five destroyers (their type was not ascertained); on the 5th the army transport ship “Republic”.
2. The following ships were observed moving from the Atlantic into the Pacific:
On June Ist, a transport ship which appeared to be also a repair ship (two funnels, two masts, extremely high sides and bridge, two turrets, directly behind the foremast there was one —– —–, one winch amidship and one on the stern. On the afterdeck, there were three scouting planes). On the 5th, three naval special service ships.
Furthermore, at about —– o’clock on the 30th of May, while sailing along the Central American coast, it seems that the Sagami Maru observed five ships, apparently destroyers, moving off to the north.
3. On the 2nd, two naval special service ships came to anchor off the Balboa piers. These were seen to come from the Atlantic. One of these is discharging anti-aircraft shells. At the same anchorage, an army transport “John R. R. Hanna” is unloading bombs.
Relayed to Washington.
Trans. 6-19-41
No. 227
FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 17, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) # 19.
(Part 1 of 2)
Action Tokyo as # 62.
The Italian Minister showed me many secret charts made by the Canal Zone Administration, showing the locations of equipment, guns and other military establishments in the Canal Zone.
I glanced through them, and found them to be extremely detailed. In considering the process by which these charts were obtained, I feel that it would be absolutely impossible to obtain them in the future. Accordingly, I approached the Italian Minister regarding them. It appears that he has no objections to our making copies of them, provided that this is done in Tokyo, after we have delivered them to the Italian Embassy there. However, as all ports here are being very closely watched, there is no other way of taking these charts out except by plane.
I wonder if it would not be possible to have some Japanese merchant in South America, who is either returning to Japan, or is being transferred to some other country, take these charts out; or to have one of our office-staff deliver them to a designated place? At present, all the places where recent defense operations are being carried out are being marked on these charts. This work is estimated to take about one week to finish.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The Italian Minister stated that if (handling) of this in Japan caused too much delay, there is no other way than to take them by plane from —– to Washington (?). In this case, he stated that he would want to have it (copied ?) at (Washington ?). Please send instructions without fail.
Secret.
Note: Translation doubtful. Part 2 of 2 unavailable.
Trans. 6-25-41
No. 228
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) June 23, 1941
TO: Mexico (Koshi) # 106.
Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attaché, Kihara, make an official trip to Panama. It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him.
Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval attaché, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns.
Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their report # 62 [a] of 17 June from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very short for security, or be in innocuous plain language.)
[a] See II, 227.
Trans. 6-24-41
No. 229
FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 67.
From Minister YAMAGATA.
Re message # 219 from Mexico to the Foreign Minister [a].
There is also the matter of Minister MIURA’s admonitions. When he inquired as to the method of handling baggage upon arrival in Guatemala he was told that as a general rule only baggage that would be taken into a hotel would have to be examined upon departure. Therefore, each person’s hand baggage as well as suitcases containing diplomatic documents, at the present time, cannot be taken out without being opened or going through customs. —– —– —– —– —– —– —–. Our idea is that the Customs authorities should merely place a seal on the suitcases without giving them a thorough examination. Then on departure there would be no need to demand investigations of the contents of these bags and, of course, each person’s hand baggage similarly sealed.
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US Relayed to Mexico.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10-1-41
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No. 230
FROM: Mexico City June 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #230.
Re my # 219 [a] and Panama’s # 60 [a] to the Foreign Minister .
In the case of Minister Yamagata as well, with the exception of the “sealed” suitcase containing diplomatic documents, they insisted that it was necessary to inspect his baggage as usual. Only, as a matter of fact, at the time of departure, the inspection was not carried out. On the other hand, in my case, in view of the fact that in Guatemala, a country to which I am accredited, rights that ordinarily are recognized by international law were violated by an aviation company with U.S. affiliations, and in view of the fact that this violation was tolerated by the Guatemala government, I think this ought to be made the subject of appropriate steps either in Washington or in Tokyo. It may be that independently of this a protest should be presented to the Guatemala government, with demands for assurance that such a situation will not arise a second time. If the said government, because of pressure from the U.S., should refuse to comply, I think we should give serious consideration to further counter measures.
Please give me your opinions by return dispatch.
Your # 110 [b] was relayed the 24th. —– This has been relayed to Washington.
Note: Above appears to be explanation for delay in taking out SECRET MAPS from Panama by plane.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 231-Tokyo directs Mexico to transmit a former message to Washington; as it bears a relation to the postponement of instructions pertaining to the procuring and forwarding to Tokyo of charts of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.
Trans. 7-3-41
No. 231
FROM: Tokyo June 27, 1941
TO: Mexico # 110.
Please transmit your message # 210 [a] to Washington. The substance of that message has a relation to the postponement for awhile of the putting into effect of my message # l06 [b].
[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 228. The Jap Foreign Minister wires the Jap Amb. at Mexico City, directing procedure to be followed for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, and forwarding to Japan by Naval Attaché Sato. Directs utmost caution in carrying out this mission and in exchange of any telegrams between Mexico City and Panama.
Trans. 6-30-41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 232
FROM: Washington July 1, 1941
TO: Mexico # 008.
Action Tokyo as # 453.
Regarding your #317 [a].
On the 20th, I sent Iguti to the office of the chief of the Far Eastern Section to protest the unlawful treatment shown to Minister Miura by the officials of the Pan American Airways and also to request that the company in question be instructed as to the proper method of handling hand luggage of our diplomatic officials and couriers hereafter.
However, since the acts committed concern the procedure of the aviation company alone in its effort to assure the safety of flight and to avoid the air accidents, it is questionable whether we can rightfully make demands on the United States government on the grounds of diplomatic and consular prerogative. (Sometime ago when similar questions came up in the Philippines, I understand that it was decided not to handle this question on the basis of diplomatic and consular prerogatives).
I am inclined to believe that it should be considered more rightly as a question of courtesy. Furthermore, if we are to claim diplomatic prerogative, based on international law, it would be more proper, just as was stated in Minister Miura’s telegram, to make representations to the Guatemala government. For this reason, in dealing with the State Department, we avoided bringing up the question of diplomatic prerogative.
[a] The violation of our rights by the P.L.E. (P.A.A. ?) Co. is unjust and the continued toleration of this by the U.S. is viewed by Japan as an unfriendly attitude which might affect our future relations. See also II, 230.
Trans. 7-3-41
No. 233
FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Mexico # 113.
Re your # 230 [a].
Will you please file a written protest to the Guatemalan Government through its Ambassador in Mexico. I have already issued instructions to have a protest submitted to the State Department of the United States. Please transmit this message to Washington.
[a] See II, 230. Mexico asks Tokyo to take steps to protest the violation by an aviation company in Guatemala of rights ordinarily recognized by international law. This message refers to a message pertaining to the procuring and forwarding to Tokyo of charts of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.
Trans. 7-25-41
A-131
No. 234
FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US
The Legation is now old and insecure, so we have discovered a suitable furnished house to let with three stories and an extensive garden. The third floor consists of three bedrooms and a wide verandah; the second has a dining room, guest rooms, and porches in various places, while the first floor is chiefly a storeroom and a gymnasium. It is probably capable of accommodating two hundred people at a reception. I believe we can obtain a two year lease at $400 on it beginning July 15th. Since there is a scarcity here of rentable houses and since we have an option on it only until the 25th, please answer immediately, and in the meantime I shall put in an application.
Trans. 7-2-41
No. 235
FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 26, 1941
TO: Rio #1.
Due to the sudden change in the international situation, our mission here will probably be given up. This is for your information.
Relay to Buenos Aires.
Trans. 9-20-41
No. 236
FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941
TO: Panama No number.
To Consul-General YAMAGATA.
I would like to have you remain in Panama for awhile and work on our flanking policy as a consultant to IZAWA. As to your trip to Chile suggested in my # 474 there is no objection to your visiting that country on your way to your post, and to your giving up your trip to Columbia.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 8-26-41
No. 237
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 4, 1941
TO: Panama # 49.
Please transmit this to Minister YAMAGATA.
You are ordered to Chile as of the 4th.
Trans. 7-23-41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 238
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Panama # 51.
To Minister YAMAGATA.
Your credentials and Minister SHIOZAKI’s release will be issued in two or three days. As it will be impossible to deliver them before your arrival, a translation is being sent immediately by telegraph. Please accept this, as its presentation in lieu of credentials has already been discussed with the Chilean Government.
Trans. 8-5-41
No. 239
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 8, 1941
TO: Los Angeles # 10.
The Diet party inspecting Central and South America is scheduled to leave Los Angeles on the Panama plane. Please let me know by telegraph if arrangements for seat reservations have been made.
Trans. 7-20-41
No. 240
FROM: Buenos Aires (Usui) July 10, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 203.
To Secretary USUI.
As Minister YAMAGATA has been relieved, they are very busy at that office. Therefore, please go to your new post by air. Please acknowledge this by return telegram.
Trans. 7-23-41
No. 241
FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 12, 1941
TO: Panama # 3.
If Minister YAMAGATA and party are still at Panama, please convey the following to them. If they have already left, please transmit it to their forwarding office.
1. To Minister YAMAGATA. I have received reports that your tour to Central and South America has been given up. Please let me know if this is true, as it has a bearing upon my preparations.
2. To Secretary USUI. If the tour of Central and South America has been given up, please return immediately to your station by air and let me know by telegraph when you will arrive.
Trans. 8-5-41
A-133
No. 242
FROM: Panama (Izawa) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 35.
(Message to Tokyo # 110)
According to intelligence emanating from a close relative of the President, it is understood that in the last cabinet meeting he stated that in the event of American participation he could see no course but for participation on the part of his country in keeping with the terms of agreement. Until such time, however, he continued, the current neutral stand will be maintained and the country will avoid taking discriminating measures against belligerent countries as well.
Relayed to Washington.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
